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This paper reviews the implications of the 
abortion referendum in Ireland along with the 
background that led to the referendum. 
 
Review  
This paper concerns the implications of the 
abortion referendum in Ireland, or rather, to be 
precise, a vote in favour of the Thirty-sixth 
Amendment of the Constitution of Ireland Bill 
2018,1 which was intended to repeal the Eight 
Amendment of the same constitution which 
guarantees the unborn child for the right to life 
unless the pregnancy is life threatening. The current 
Bill will (by an act of parliament) replace Article 
40.3.3 of the Constitution which was added in 1983 
and subsequently amended in 1992.2 
One must immediately point out that the 1983 
amendment made no reference to the philosophical 
doctrine of double effect whereby harm can be 
caused even if it is foreseen but is not intended and 
indirect. As we will see this has important 
consequences in a Catholic Hospital which was 
accused, rightly so, of a medical misadventure in 
Ireland causing the death of a woman who was 17 
weeks pregnant, where the termination could have 

















The death of Savita Halappanavar 
Savita Halappanavar was 31 years old and 17 
weeks pregnant. She died on 28th October 2012 
after being admitted a week before when it was 
diagnosed that she would miscarry. She requested a 
termination at that stage; a request which was 
denied as she was not deemed to be in danger of 
losing her life. During the subsequent seven days 
she developed sepsis. By the time it was diagnosed 
and an attempt to treat with misoprostol was started, 
she had already delivered the baby but the ongoing 
sepsis caused a cardiac arrest later. Indeed the 
doctors were accused in the Coroner’s Inquest that 
there was poor communication in the case, poor 
management, poor record keeping, and indeed a 
poor system which led to a failure to diagnose the 
sepsis early enough. This could have saved the 
patient’s life.3 
The death is said to have caused an arousal by 
the public and media which led to the 36th 
amendment of 2018. It is important therefore to 
understand why a law which allows the termination 
of pregnancy if the life of the woman is in danger 
can cause, even if other issues which were criticised 
by the coroner were correctly in place, doctors to 
hesitate and wait for complications like sepsis to 
develop. There is an interplay between 
understanding the law and indeed understanding 
moral issues, especially, in the case the hospital in 
Galway being a Catholic Hospital, a clear 
understanding of the principle of double effect 
which is enshrined in the magisterium of the 
Catholic Church and written clearly in the Church’s 
Catechism available for the public, and supposedly 
within the realm of a medical curriculum. If a Law 
deliberately leaves something out, it is done with 
intention and therefore the principle of double effect 
is accepted under its aegis. 
Clearly enough gynaecologists do not hesitate to 
remove ectopic pregnancies and a cancerous 
pregnant uterus which would involve the removal 
of the unborn child. This follows the doctrine of 
double effect, which has the following conditions:4 
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1. That the action itself be good or at least 
neutral 
2. The good effect is the intended outcome and 
not the bad (which is seen as indirect) 
3. The good must not be brought about by a bad 
(or evil) effect 
4. That there be a proportionately grave reason 
for permitting the evil.  
So this raises the question, even if the doctors 
were correct in assuming that the life of the woman 
was in danger, whether such a case could have been 
more effectively (and efficiently) handled by 
invoking this principle. Clearly: 
1. The diagnosis that the baby was going to be 
miscarried was made. 
2. The request of the patient was ignored, or at 
least not considered in its possibility by 
thinking about double effect; something which 
ought to be in every doctor’s duty. 
3. Doctors took a risk by waiting for a ‘natural’ 
outcome. 
4. It was clear that the death of the baby was 
foreseen and accepted.  
At the end of life, when one gives morphine, it 
is clearly understood that even if this hastens death, 
once death is accepted as the outcome, this can be 
done. This specific case is even (for Catholics) 
listed in the Catechism (5) under Ordinary Care. 
When death is an outcome therefore, the comfort of 
the patient is not only paramount, but also seen as a 
‘charitable’ thing to do. So why did the Irish 
doctors fail in this case? Clearly there can only be 
two reasons, the first being that abortion is a very 
contended and controversial issue in a Catholic 
Country, and secondly (as the HSE in Ireland 
recommend) there was a lack of training of health 
professionals about the law – which usually clouds, 
out of fear of breaking the law, the judgement of 
doctors. 
Clearly the law would not allow termination 
unless there was an immediate physiological threat. 
It will also allows for termination if there is a risk 
of suicide. Such calls are not that easy to follow. 
Can one give the benefit of the doubt. It is clear 
however that the law uses the term ‘physiological’ 
and not ‘pathological’. Following philosophy of 
law, these terms have a clear intention. One need 
not wait for a physiological condition to develop 
into a pathological one. There was in this case a 
clear physiological process of miscarrying (even 
though this can clearly be defined as pathological). 
One notes that the termination was inevitable and 
that the request for an abortion was made after the 
patient had broken her waters. What was required 
was expediency.  
Clearly, administering misoprostol early would 
have satisfied the principle of double effect: 
1. The action would have been good (or at least 
indifferent) since the waters were already 
broken, the delivery had started, and the 
miscarriage process had been diagnosed. 
2. The good effect was the intended outcome (it 
could never have been to kill a baby whose 
death was the inevitable outcome – as in the 
morally equivalent case of administering 
morphine at the end of life). 
3. The good effect could not have been brought 
about by the evil effect, which was already in 
process. 
4. There was clear proportionality. 
Even if there can be doubt to the third 
condition, it would have only been a charitable 
thing to do to a mother whose baby is dying to 
hasten the process, once labour had started. 
Moreover avoiding risk falls under the primum non 
nocere doctrine which includes avoiding harm and 
injury4 
One can tentatively conclude that either fear 
of the law or over-enthusiastic of the application of 
catholic-moral principles could have been the 
overall cause. 
 
Implication for Ireland 
One of the biggest questions is whether the 
abortion law in Ireland will be as liberal as that of 
Britain? In matter of fact abortion in the UK is 
illegal. There is however an abortion Act6 which 
allows termination of pregnancy up to 24 weeks’ 
gestation if there is a serious health issue. The 
document needs to be signed by two doctors, 
although recently it was contended that this ought to 
be reduced to one, raising the question whether it 
will then be easier, but also an issue of trust. Health 
is a broader term than ‘medical’, as it includes not 
only the biological issues, but also psychosocial 
ones. Therefore someone who has three children 
and is a working mother in a difficult socio-
economic situation will qualify for a termination. 
Moreover the abortion Act has an amendment 
which also allows for the termination of foetuses 
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with congenital anomalies. 
That the law in the UK actually makes it 
illegal to have an abortion unless for health reasons, 
is clear from the fact the Society for the Protection 
of the Unborn Child (SPUC) had taken to court a 
drug company which produced the emergency 
contraceptive pill which was claimed to possibly 
also cause a miscarriage. The court decided in 
favour of the drug company as the term miscarriage 
implies that the woman is ‘carrying’ and that 
therefore implantation has occurred. Emergency 
contraception does not cause a miscarriage. Of 
course the term miscarried fell into the trap of 
philosophy of language as clearly the SPUC did not 
imply that. The British Episcopal Conference then 
made a statement on when emergency contraception 
can be use. 
A second example of the illegality of abortion 
is the guideline of the Royal College of 
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists on laparoscopic 
removal of ectopic pregnancies.7 This method of 
removing the embryo in an ectopic pregnancy 
whilst preserving the tube has been seen in some 
circles as a ‘direct’ destruction of the embryo and 
therefore laparoscopic removal cannot satisfy the 
principle of double effect. The ‘pound of flesh’ is 
necessary. The guidelines will recommend 
laparoscopic removal only under certain 
circumstances, for example that only one tube is 
remaining. 
Nevertheless the broad definition of ‘health’ 
and the termination of foetuses with congenital 
anomalies have given rise to quite a liberal law. 
There is clearly a danger for Ireland that this can be 
the case unless it restricts the law only to medical 
reasons, albeit not necessarily life threatening. This 
would bring about certain problems: which medical 
reasons is one to accept? Will gestational induced 
diabetes or hypertension count? If one cannot 
restrict oneself to medical, what constitutes a 
‘serious risk’ to health has to be defined if Ireland is 
not to follow the UK. As pointed out, if the law 
deliberately fails to define this, it will have done so 
with an intention to leave it open to interpretation. 
 
Moral issues 
Clearly laws of abortion do not (or need not) 
question that an embryo is a human life. Whilst 
philosophical some say that one cannot see the 
deliberate killing of a two year old child and that of 
a fertilized egg as morally equivalent, others 
(especially the more conservative) do. But no law 
has equated this, not even locally. In the local 
scenario the woman is given the benefit of the doubt 
that she may have been psychologically affected 
and the maximum sentence is three years (and not 
life) imprisonment. No other law makes this kind of 
exception. 
Clearly abortion is more about women’s 
rights. Often the term ‘innocent child’ is used. This 
is mostly rhetoric and cannot hold either 
philosophical or legal ground. Everyone is innocent 
until proved guilty in the eyes of the law. If a 
woman has to have a right to an abortion, clearly 
one would have to either over-ride the right to life 
of the woman over that of the foetus, or see the 
moral weight of a developing human as increasing 
over time. Theologically and for conservative 
philosophy this will not do. But many do see reason 
behind the greater gravity of killing an eight month 
from a two week gestation. The question then 
becomes when does the moral value of the foetus 
outweigh the right of the woman to abort it. This 
certainly would not be an easy question to answer 
and many countries have defined it arbitrarily and at 
different stages. Clearly the fact that all European 
countries except Malta are now in favour of 
abortion has its weight, if anything because it shows 
what ‘reasonable society’ (Defining ‘reasonable’ 
through the eyes of the law from ‘reasonable person 
standard’) has seen fit. 
 
Local Implications 
Can one see emergency contraception (EC) as 
having opened the window for abortion? Clearly 
this has been pointed out even in the Parliamentary 
Social Affairs Committee8 but probably not. 
Abortion is a much larger issue than emergency 
contraception. The latter was about preventing 
pregnancy and not about terminating it. The 
argument in fact centred around whether EC was 
abortifacient – some arguing that it was and others 
that it was not. The principle of not killing a baby 
was accepted. Of course political arguments are not 
only emotive but often deliberately deceptive. The 
true argument should have been, ‘even if EC was 
possibly abortifacient, what are the chances that it 
will’. Here WHO rates of pregnancy could have 
helped to show that after 12 hours (hence morning 
after) the chances of a pregnancy are 0.5%. The 
question then would have been one of when this 
small chance outweighs any risk for an (unknown) 
6
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The question of abortion can only come about 
with a government which has the confidence it will 
remain in place notwithstanding opposition. There 
is also no guarantee that all parliamentarians of 
each side will vote the same. Local women can 
easily have access to abortion, and if it is seen that 
this is a women’s health issue, the EU may even 
intervene to have governments pay for abortions 
abroad (although up till now the European Court of 
Justice has upheld Member States’ laws). Probably 
no one can oblige a woman to remain pregnant; one 
can only appeal to women to think about the child 
they are carrying. Conversely one ought to seriously 
consider terminations when the life of the woman is 
seriously in danger in order to avoid what can be a 
very complicated interpretation of the principle of 
double effect.   
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